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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

Improving Maritime Surveillance in Kenya’s
remote Coastal Islands: Application of renewable
energy solutions.

Degree:

MSc

Maritime Surveillance encompasses tools and activities designed to enable
governments gain understanding of everything in the maritime environment that can
pose security threat. Such threats can take the form of piracy and armed robbery,
organized crime such as, human and drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal exploitation
of marine resources or the destruction of marine resources through dumping and
pollution. Kenya’s geographical position, in the vicinity of a piracy prone region
inevitably puts her at risk.
This thesis analyses Kenya’s maritime surveillance regime as currently constituted,
with a view to identifying gaps and possible areas for improvement. The absence of
grid connection has often been cited as a major handicap to the installation of robust
electronics for maritime surveillance. The Kenyan Maritime Administration, which has
the overall regulatory mandate on maritime affairs in Kenya was incorporated in May
2004 and is in the process of setting up the necessary infrastructure for maritime
surveillance. Among the projects earmarked for prioritization in this regard is a coastal
surveillance system. Of particular concern are remote Islands making up the Lamu
archipelago, near the maritime boundary with Somalia.
It is very difficult to change or upgrade an energy system after it has been established.
In order to choose the right system and technology for a specific application, budget,
and geographical location, it is important to take into account all the underlying factors
and externalities. This helps in avoiding future switching costs while rendering the
performance of the selected option more efficient. In terms of maritime surveillance,
each region presents unique challenges, which need to be specifically investigated,
in order to leverage available facilities and capabilities in the context of inter-agency
engagement.
This thesis concludes that with the available energy resources in Kenya, and mature
status of wind and solar energy technologies, maritime surveillance of remote outlying
coastal islands in Kenya can be greatly improved through renewable energy power
solutions. The aim is therefore to deliver powerful information for decision-makers
responsible for planning in the maritime administration.

KEY WORDS: Maritime Surveillance, Situational Awareness, Renewable
Energy, Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE).
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1.0

CHAPTER 1

Background

The approach to ports, coastlines and navigation channels constitute vital
transportation infrastructure that require protection from a myriad of risks and
challenges. Kenya has 614 Km. of coastline and 143,000 km2 of Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) (IHO- Kenya National Report to South African and Islands Hydrographic
Commission (SAIHC), as well as a busy shipping lane and remote islands, as depicted
in figure 1 below. According to the European Commission’s (EC) Joint Research
Centre, “Surveillance is a key element to exercise national sovereignty at sea” (2008,
EC Joint Research Centre). These sea areas require continuous surveillance and
protection.
Depending on the intended mission,
maritime surveillance can be realized
through a suite of reporting / messaging
systems which either rely on vessels to
provide
systems

own

information

which

or

sensor

autonomously

collect

information about ships. The scope and
mode of surveillance depends upon the
domain

of

environmental

interest,

ranging

protection,

from

fisheries

protection, border control and territorial
sovereignty. Ultimately, the primary aim is
1: Map of Kenya
either to identify and deter infringement to Figure
Source: Wikipedia
regulations or to ensure safety and security. Africa’s coastline, measuring around

30,500 km is confronted with a myriad of challenges. “The vastness of Africa’s
maritime domain provides great opportunity for exploitation by terrorists. Terrorist
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activities therefore constitute a latent threat….” (O.S Ibrahim, 2009). This complicates
the maritime surveillance challenges, and calls for complete paradigm shift from the
traditional approaches to more proactive and security-focused approach.
Large portions of Kenya’s coastline are very remote and lack reliable communication
infrastructure, mainly attributed to lack of connection to the national power grid. At the
peak of the piracy menace off Somalia waters, numerous acts of piracy were staged
on vessels destined to the port of Mombasa. Such sporadic attacks also targeted
fishing boats and dhows, which were then used to further orchestrate the crime (use
of mother boats). Between 2013 and 2015, virtually no successful acts of piracy were
reported within waters of this region (IMB Piracy Reports on trends of piracy).
However as recent reports show, piracy is still a huge regional challenge because
underlying causes, such as illegal fishing and dumping in the Somalia piracy context
remain unresolved. The economic cost of maritime piracy is on an upward trajectory,
as Somali pirate networks resume attacks on ships. According to a recent report by
“Oceans Beyond Piracy” Group, the cost attributable to piracy in Somalia increased
to 1.7 Billion Dollars in 2016, from 1.3 Billion Dollars in 2015. This includes costs paid
by shipping operators for increased insurance, labour, armed guards and other
protection measures, as well as ransoms paid by insurers and the cost of naval
deployments. So far in 2017, there have been two high-profile hijackings by Somali
pirates: The Aris Tanker in March and an Indian flagged commercial ship in April
(Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2017)
Although the combined intervention by Naval escort convoys and military action inside
Somalia had appeared to ebb the tide of piracy between 2013 to late 2015, the recent
resurgence is an indication that the pirate networks remain strategically poised and
ready to attack commercial ships, at any slight opportunity. Dalaklis, 2012 analysed
many of the important factors in the Somali piracy context, and concluded that piracy
would only diminish when the rule of law is well established in the burdened country.
A more effective and sustainable tool to keep vigilance and secure this sea area is
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necessary, and focus seems to be gravitating towards Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA)1.
The sea route bordering the State of Somalia and through the Horn of Africa, is very
critical for global trade. International Maritime Organization (IMO), European Union
(EU), United States of America (USA) and Regional Governments have made heavy
investment in capacity building and technology transfer to make this sea area safe.
Under the Global Search & Rescue (SAR) arrangements, Kenya has obligations
relating to Search and Rescue coordination over an expansive portion of this sea area
as well as 614 km of immediate territorial coastline dotted with a number of small
remote islands. A thriving community of fishermen, with generally good understanding
of local maritime environment and well-organized Beach Management Units (BMUs),
dominates these remote islands. This fishing community can be engaged for proactive
roles in maritime situational awareness. However, this capability can be impeded by
lack of constructive engagement and poor state of communication infrastructure.
According to a 2013 Watercraft and Baseline Survey Report by Kenya Maritime
Authority (KMA) there are 206 fish landing sites along Kenya’s Indian Ocean
Coastline, with a substantial number of these in private hands. Out of 16,805 surveyed
watercrafts, 1894 were anchored and operated on privately owned sites. Given the
remoteness of most of these regions, security ramifications can be severe.
Therefore, analysis of the status of existing maritime surveillance forms the gist of this
research undertaking. The immediate motivation is to establish the potential for
renewable energy solutions in addressing communication gaps, hence improving
maritime situational awareness in the areas.
1.1

Research objectives

Despite the compelling need for functional maritime surveillance systems to improve
security situation in sea routes and archipelagic waters around Kenya’s Indian Ocean
coastline, the challenges relating to power source have not come to a fruitful end. In
seeking a solution, this thesis will:

1 MDA is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain

safety, the environment and economy.
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that affects

a. Explore the viability of wind and solar power harvesting in these remote Islands
for applications in maritime surveillance systems.
b. Then assess how the identified, viable renewable energy options can be
effectively used to power maritime surveillance equipment.
c. Analyze the existing surveillance structure in the context of evolving maritime
challenges in the region, and how renewable energy can deliver improvements.
1.2

Research questions

For an exhaustive investigation of the topic, answers to the following research
questions are sought:
a) Can renewable energy technologies be harnessed for application in maritime
surveillance systems in Kenya’s remote Coastal Islands?
b) Are there additional measures and facilities that can deliver improvements to
Kenya’s overall Coastal Surveillance arrangements within the constraints of the
maritime administration and civilian stakeholder agencies’ capabilities?
Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of the current operational structure of maritime
surveillance will lead to improved understanding of gaps that need to be
addressed. In this context, the research questions are,
c) What are the inherent risks of weak maritime surveillance in these remote coastal
Islands? Based on case studies of successful implementations of maritime
surveillance systems, how will the envisaged improvements to the maritime
surveillance system enhance incident reporting and response capability in these
areas?
1.3

Research Methodology

This thesis is compiled in the context of several academic studies, taking into account
their insightful findings, recommendations and research methodologies. It involved
the analysis of data and information from articles, books, journals, electronic sources,
periodicals and reports. Costs and technical data relating to renewable energy
technologies were sourced from government departments, renowned institutions, and
organizations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Renewable Energy
Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), the National renewable energy
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laboratories (NREL), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the
World Energy Council.
Several company documents and expert references were also perused for data on
the research topic. Information on the current vessel reporting systems and maritime
surveillance arrangements was obtained from Kenya Maritime Authority and
Mombasa Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC). Information on
the international legal framework and maritime security reports was sourced from the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Baltic and International Maritime
Council (BIMCO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Shipping Centre,
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and
Oceans Beyond Piracy.
A practical field survey covering the whole stretch of the Kenyan coastline is included.
The physical survey was limited to obtaining GPS coordinates, area elevation above
sea level and assessing accessibility. GPS data and area elevation are essential
parameters for ascertaining conditions for effective Very High Frequency (VHF)
triangulation. This thesis is organized in three thematic areas. The first part discusses
renewable energy technologies, with a focus on the economic drivers surrounding
renewable energy applications in maritime surveillance. The second part broadly
examines maritime surveillance from the standpoint of facilities and arrangements at
the disposal of the Maritime Authority and Civilian Agencies in Kenya. The third part
analyses

the

current

scenario

and

arrangements,

and

concludes

with

recommendations for the improvement of maritime surveillance.
1.4

Thesis outline

Chapter 1 contains a synopsis of this dissertation task, highlighting the nature of the
problem, objectives of the study and the research scope. Chapter 2 is an extensive
literature review of contemporary applications of renewable energy technologies and
Kenya’s policy framework on renewable energy.
Chapter 3 explores maritime surveillance and ship reporting systems, including AIS,
VMS, LRIT and Coastal VHF coverage in Kenya. The Global SAR regime in the
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context of national, regional and international obligations and arrangements are also
examined.
Chapter 4 discusses Kenya’s multi-agency approach to maritime surveillance, and
civilian agencies’ input with respect to maritime safety and security. These are
weighed in terms of their adequacy to the huge regional challenge of piracy and
maritime crime. Reported maritime incidents are analysed to establish correlation
between absence of robust maritime surveillance and the preponderance of incidents.
The causal mechanisms approach is applied.
Chapter 5 features a case study pertaining to the successful implementation of
maritime surveillance. It examines how Papua New Guinea (PNG), with a coastline
measuring 20,197 km and EEZ covering 3,120,000 km2, has successfully
implemented a surveillance system fully powered from renewable energy sources.
The chapter delves into the scope for improvement in Kenya’s surveillance
arrangements, by juxtaposition to the PNG system. This is followed by a consolidation
of the main outcomes and assumptions, into a coherent and focused roadmap for the
overall improvement of maritime surveillance. Conclusions and recommendations
drawn from the study are presented in this chapter.
1.5

Delimitations.

This dissertation explores the status of maritime surveillance in detached remote
islands in light of the lingering challenges of maritime crime and piracy. It then
examines how the application of renewable energy can be used to mitigate the
challenges. It further analyses the regulatory framework to cope with maritime crime,
including regional arrangements to improve situational awareness, in order to identify
opportunities for improvement. The conclusions derived are construed to be
specifically representative of Kenyan scenario.
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2

2.1

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

This chapter reviews some studies so far undertaken on renewable energy. The focus
is on the economic considerations pertinent to planning and uptake of renewable
energy for maritime surveillance applications in remote coastal islands. Generally,
prospects for the application of renewable energy technologies across many facets of
human endeavours appear bright. The Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st
Century (REN21) reported in 2016 that 44 million off-grid pico-solar products had
been sold globally by mid-2015, representing an annual market of 300 million US
Dollars. There are huge prospects for maritime surveillance systems to tap into the
fast expanding renewable energy sector.
2.2

Renewable Energy

Renewable energy is a concept that is fast capturing global attention. It has been
variously described, as energy from a source that is not depleted when used, and
according to “Dictionary.com”, it is “any naturally occurring, theoretically inexhaustible
source of energy for instance biomass, solar, wind, tidal wave and hydro, that is not
derived from fossil or nuclear fuel” (Dictionary.com)
A more concise and encompassing definition is by Islam et al, (2014) which states
that renewable sources are “those that are abundant in nature, and derived from
natural processes with no depletion in the course of utilization” (Islam, Shahir, Uddin,
& Saifullah, 2014).
There is a vast collection of available literature on renewable energy. L.A Kristoferson
and V. Bokalders, (2013) explored the renewable energy technologies, and
demonstrated their growing prominence in developing countries. Dimakis et al. (2011)
examined the various methods and tools to evaluate the potential and exploitable
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energy sources. The approach emphasized attention to site-specific environmental
aspects.
Weisser (2004) analysed the dynamics of power generation in Small Island
Developing States (SIDS) and extolled the unique characteristics in SIDS that make
fossil fuel-based electricity generation very costly. He emphasized the need for
paradigm shift in energy planning. The conclusions of his study immensely lend
themselves to the scenario under review in this thesis.
Bergmann et al. (2006) evaluated external benefits and costs with respect to
renewable energy investment. Although the study was based on the Scotland
scenario, the conclusions on external costs and benefits to be considered for optimal
investment in renewable energy options have universal applicability. Mondal et al.
(2010) analysed the drivers, barriers and strategies for implementation of renewable
energy technologies in rural areas in Bangladesh, through an innovative approach
with immense applicability in developing regions with similar circumstances.
2.3

Renewable Energy Potential

To maximize the benefits obtainable from a renewable energy technology in a country,
it is important to weigh the technology in the context of existing energy strategies and
plans, financial, institutional as well as legal frameworks. J. P. Painuly, (2000)
proposed three dimensions upon which to gauge potential: technological potential,
techno-economic potential and economic potential.
2.4

Costs and Trends in Renewable Energy uptake

The aspect of cost and projections on its trend is a core decision attribute in renewable
energy applications. In its 2017 outlook on renewable energy, the Frankfurt School
(FS) – UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate Change and Sustainable Energy
Finance projects that: “There were two main reasons for the fall in investment in
renewables in 2016. One was lower costs, with average dollar capital expenditure per
MW down by more than 10% for solar photovoltaics, onshore wind and offshore wind,
improving the competitiveness of those technologies. The other was not so positive –
there was a marked slowdown in financings in China, Japan and some emerging
markets during the course of the year” (Frankfurt School (FS)-UNEP Collaborating
Centre for Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Finance, 2017).
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In a similar assessment, the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century
(REN21) concluded that: “Rapid growth, particularly in the power sector, is driven by
several factors, including the improving cost competitiveness of renewable energy
technologies, dedicated policy initiatives, better access to financing, energy security
and environmental concerns as well as growing demand for energy in the developing
and emerging economies” (REN21, 2016).
2.5

Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE)

The World Energy Council defines LCOE as the price that has to be received per unit
of output as payment for producing power, in order to reach a specified financial return
or put simply “the price that a project must earn per megawatt hour in order to break
even.” (World Energy Council, 2013).
According to the Frankfurt School FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate change
and Sustainable Energy Finance, (2017) it is the “all-in one cost of generating each
MWh of electricity from a power plant, including not only fuel used, but also the cost
of project development, construction, financing, operation and maintenance”.
(Frankfurt School FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre, 2017)
Analytically, LCOE2 is denoted by:
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =

Lifecycle Cost ( $)
… … … … … … 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1
2𝑎𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑘𝑊ℎ)

LCOE Computation
Based on National Renewable Energy Laboratories’ (NREL) Solar‐PV Manufacturing
Cost Model, the Plant envelope incorporates the following elements

2

Equation 1: Levelised Cost of Energy
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Table 1: LCOE Elements

1

Category
Infrastructure

2

Equipment

3

Electrical Infrastructure

4

Financial Costs

Elements
Land acquisition
Site preparation
Installation of underground components
Access roads
Fencing
Operations
buildings
and
related
maintenance
Module supply
Power electronics
AC and DC components
Installation.
Transformers
Switchgear
Electrical Systems
Connecting Modules.
Preliminary Feasibility & Engineering studies
Environmental studies
Permits
Legal Fees
Insurance costs
Development Costs
Property taxes during construction.

.In this study, a Levelised Cost of Energy calculator was used to compare the LCOE
cost of 17 technologies. The results and excel extract are included in appendix. For
solar power the LCOE is US$ 85/MWh while for onshore wind, it is US$ 58/MWh.
2.5.1

Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Operating Expenditure (OPEX)

The World Energy Council defines CAPEX as the total cost of developing and
constructing a plant, excluding any grid-connection charges. Feldman et al, (2015)
and also Beamon and Leff, (2013), view CAPEX as representing the total expenditure
required to achieve operation in a given year. On the other hand, OPEX is “the total
annual operating expenditure from the first year of a project’s operation, given in per
unit of installed capacity terms.” (World Energy Council, 2013).
2.5.2

Capacity factor (Load Factor)

The World Energy Council defines Capacity Factor as “the ratio of the net megawatt
hours of electricity generated in a given year to the electricity that could have been
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generated at continuous full-power operation, or 8,760 (per annum) full hours” (World
Energy Council, 2013).
2.5.3

Society’s Cost of Energy.

This ascribes a much broader scope to the cost of energy, by taking into account
factors such as the number of jobs created by energy source, subsidies, transmission
costs, variability costs, geopolitical risk impact, besides also taking into account the
Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE). It was proposed by Siemens “to measure the true
cost of electricity generated by various sources” (Siemens AG, 2014)
2.5.4

Maritime Surveillance Systems powered by Solar and Wind:

Several studies have been undertaken to establish the suitability of renewable energy
for powering up surveillance systems in remote areas lacking connection to the
national power grid. In 2011, the Border and Maritime Security Division (BMD) of the
United States (US), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and National Renewable
Energy Laboratories (NREL) conducted a joint study on border-security energy
demands. The rationale of their study was to ensure that advances in renewable
energy and energy storage would be reflected in improved security situation..
They summarized the factors that make renewable energy particularly attractive for
applications in maritime surveillance and border security, including the following:
Operational continuity arising from grid failure. Installed renewable energy sources
can sustain critical loads until grid service is restored. The greater the proportion of
renewable energy technologies, the longer the operations can be sustained without
grid power.
Renewable energy technologies can reliably operate independent of the grid in
remote locations, and often require very little maintenance. This can extend the
capabilities in remote border-security operations. Also Some renewable energy
technologies such as PV operate silently and require little maintenance. These
characteristics make them very useful in locations where covert operations are
necessary.
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On the other hand, aging energy infrastructure poses a threat to national security.
Electricity generated near the load reduces reliance on the grid infrastructure, thereby
eliminating the operational burden relative to the grid infrastructure. Renewable
energy offer strategic advantages by helping hedge against volatile fuel prices and
supply interruptions, as well as reducing dependence on fossil fuels supplied from
regions of conflict. Renewable energy technologies are also clean, sustainable and
mostly emission-free.
To ascertain whether the power requirements of a given surveillance system can be
met from renewable sources, it is necessary to establish the operational energy profile
of the unit, in terms of peak power consumption, the duration of consumption (volts
(V), amps (A), watts (W), phase, and whether it draws alternating current or direct
current. It is also necessary to establish whether the unit is optimized for off-grid
deployment, whether there is need for emergency backup and if so, the redundancy
level necessary.
2.5.5

Solar Energy

Solar Energy can be processed either through Photovoltaic (PV) systems that directly
convert the solar energy into electrical, or Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) systems
which first convert the solar energy into thermal energy, then onwards to electrical
engine through a thermal engine.
There is a downward trend in the cost of solar systems worldwide. The International
Renewable Energy Association (IRENA) has made a projection that reflects this
downward trend, as depicted in figure 3 below. The plummeting cost of solar systems
across the entire gamut of application areas justifies initiatives to explore usage in
maritime surveillance systems.
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Figure 2: Solar System Installed Cost: Worldwide Trend
Source: IRENA, 2017

Table 2 below provides a snapshot of typical efficiency figures for thin film and wafer
technologies in the category of Commercialized PVs.
Table 2: Solar PV Technologies,
Source: NREL

1

PV technology

Variation & Properties

Thin Film

Lower cost per unit of power
produced

Efficiency

Amorphous Silicon

7%

Cadmium Telluride

11%

Copper, Indium, Gallium,
Selenide (CIGS)

11%

2

Wafer PV

Have greater efficiencies than
thin film technologies

14% to 20%

3

Multi-junction PV

Capture different spectra of
light, thus increasing overall
efficiency of the composite
system.

Up to 30% efficiency in
systems that concentrate
sunlight by up to 500 times

2.5.6

Photovoltaics

Based on assessment conducted by the National Renewable Energy Laboratories
(NREL) of USA, PV panels do not have moving parts, and when combined with
batteries they are very reliable. They also operate silently which accords a measure
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of stealth. Some of the shortcomings cited with respect to photovoltaics include their
requirements for additional equipment such as inverters to convert DC to AC, storage
batteries for on-grid connections and the fact that land mounted PV panels require
relatively large areas for deployment, thereby committing the land for 15 to 20 years
or longer. PVs also feature relatively low efficiencies (between 14 to 25%) compared
to other renewable energy technologies. PV panels are fragile and susceptible to easy
damage, necessitating additional overheads on insurance costs.
2.5.7

Wind

According to the NREL, the economic viability of a wind project depends on the cost
of the wind resource compared to that of electricity. A strong wind resource (Class 5
and Class 6) can compete against electricity. A modest wind resource (Class 2 and
Class 3) can compete against high-priced electricity. According to NREL, “the high
cost of electricity in an environment where there is strong wind makes wind a
compelling option with a short payback” (NREL, 2016)
Over the past decade, wind energy has experienced annual growth rates in installed
capacity of more than 30%. The wind industry has several distinct sectors, each
characterized by specific technology and deployment strategies. Each of these wind
sectors

essentially

envisage

different

technologies,

assessment

methods,

economics, environmental considerations, and factors that serve as the drivers for
those sectors. According to NREL, “There is no one design or size that is “the best in
all applications”; rather, there are applications that favor certain sizes and designs, as
they provide the better relative economics and performance within the application
driven constraints” (NREL, 2016).
2.5.8

Wind Power

The amount of wind varies with the season, time of day, and weather events. The
wind speed at any given time determines the amount of power available in the wind
and subsequently the power that can be harnessed using a wind turbine generator.
This power is given by:
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P = A Ρv3/2
Where;
P = power of the wind (watts)
A = windswept area of the rotor (blades) = πD2/4 = π r2 [m2] (π r2 [10.76 ft2])
ρ = density of the air [kg/m3] (2.2 lb/3.28 ft3) (at sea level at 15°C)
V = velocity of the wind [m/s] (3.28 ft./sec)
Wind power (P) is proportional to velocity cubed (V3). If wind velocity is doubled, wind
power increases by a factor of eight (23 = 8). Consequently, small differences in
average speed cause significant differences in energy production.
2.5.9

Hybrid Photovoltaic/ Wind Energy plus Battery System:

Hybrid renewable energy projects involve the siting of different renewable energy
projects within the same location: like solar and wind, or solar thermal and geothermal.
The main attraction here includes the ease of distribution resulting from the sharing
of one grid connection, production of more electricity per hectare of land, economy in
operating and maintenance costs, and reduction of overall intermittency. “Mini grids
are particularly viable in developing countries and on remote Islands especially with
wind and solar or wave paired with batteries or even diesel back-up generators”
(Frankfurt School (FS)-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate Change and
Sustainable Energy Finance, 2017)
Various researchers have evaluated Hybrid Renewable Energy Systems (HRES)
using different methods such as energy to load ratio, battery to load ratio, and nonavailability of energy. In order to select an optimal combination of a HRES to meet the
demand, evaluation may be carried based on reliability and economics of power
supply.
According to the Frankfurt School (FS) – UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate
Change and Sustainable Energy Finance, some 5.6GW of hybrid projects, each of
more than 10MW have been constructed or are under various stages of development
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worldwide. There is huge potential for this number to grow significantly in the years
ahead, as developers take advantage of synergies from co-locating two or more
technologies.
2.6

Hybrid Optimization Model for Electric Renewables (HOMER) Software.

HOMER renewable energy optimization software application, developed by the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in the United States, is helpful in
designing and evaluating technical and financial variables for off-grid and on-grid
power systems in remote, stand-alone and distributed generation applications. The
software enables assessment of a large number of technology options to account for
energy resource availability and other variables.
Using the HOMER software a user can input an hourly power consumption profile and
match renewable energy generation to the required load. Okedu et al, 2014 summed
up the powerful tools unleashed by HOMER software: “it allows a user to analyze
micro-grid potential, peak renewables penetration, ratio of renewable sources to
total energy, and grid stability, particularly for medium to large scale projects.
Additionally, HOMER contains a powerful optimizing function that is useful in
determining

the

cost

of

various

energy

project

scenarios” (Okedu &

Uhunmwangho, 2014)
The HOMER software simulates real technological scenarios in renewable energy,
providing very detailed results for analysis. It enables the determination of possible
combinations of technologies and sizes, hence powerful tools for optimization. On the
flip side, its accuracy entirely depends on the quality of input data. In terms of the
research topic under review, the HOMER software can provide convenient metrics for
comparing between the various power generating technologies, without practically
engaging the rigorous field research process.
2.7

Renewable Energy technologies for Maritime Surveillance applications

For purposes of this study, renewable energy options for maritime surveillance
applications are analysed from two perspectives: applications involving off-grid wind/
solar power generation - requiring the construction of small off-grid power generating
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systems. The second scope covers maritime surveillance equipment, primarily
powered by solar, with wind as a standby source (similar to the system used by Papua
New Guinea3 )
The assessment of prospects for stand-alone wind/ solar power generation in remote
Islands of Kenya necessitates an analysis of the environment, the regulatory context
of renewable energy generation in Kenya and cost aspects such as LCOE, CAPEX,
OPEX and Capacity Factor.
2.8

Energy situation in Kenya:

According to Kenya’s Energy Regulatory Commission, Kenya’s energy mix consists
of biomass (68%), hydrocarbons (22%), electricity (9%), solar and other forms of
energy (1%), with petroleum and electricity dominating the commercial energy sector.
“As at June 2015, Kenya had an installed electricity generation capacity of 2,299MW”
(Energy Regulatory Commission Annual Report, 2016). This energy mix is depicted
in figure 3 below, which projects the relative significance of each source in the
country’s overall energy mix.

Total Electricity generated
2299 MW

Energy Type %

Hydro
Biomass

Thermal

Hydrocarbons

Geothermal

Electricity
Solar & Others

Wind

Figure 3: Kenya's Energy mix

3

Papua New Guinea Maritime Surveillance System is analysed in chapter 5
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2.8.1

Management of the Energy Sector in Kenya

Several Government bodies are responsible for management of the energy sector in
Kenya. These are listed in table 3 below. Overall operation and administration of the
sector is under the remit of the Ministry of Energy & Petroleum.
Table 3: Government Bodies responsible for Energy Management in Kenya

Government Bodies
Body

Mandate

1.

Ministry of Energy

and Petroleum


Provides policy direction and prepares the least cost energy
development plan for the whole country.
Operates four Directorates, reflecting the various forms of energy
sources. These are Electric Power, Renewable Energy,
Geothermal, Oil and Petroleum.

2.

Energy Regulatory

Commission, (ERC)

Established through the energy Act 2006- provides technical,
economic and regulatory oversight on the energy sector in Kenya.

3.

Rural Electrification

Authority (REA),

Incorporated in 2007- has the mission to implement rural
electrification program.

4.

The Energy Tribunal


Has responsibility for arbitration between the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC) and aggrieved stakeholders in the energy
sector.
Electricity (Power) generating companies

1.
2.

Kenya Generating

Company (KenGen)
Independent Power

Producers (IPPs)

Generates 76% of the total country output, equivalent to 1238 MW.
It is government owned.
Generate 24% of the total energy produced, equivalent to 391 MW.
Distribution

1.

Kenya Power &
Lighting Company
(KPLCo)

Distribution of electricity to end users/ retailing.

2.

Kenya
Electricity

Transmission
Company
(KETRACO)

Incorporated in 2008- is responsible for planning, designing,
constructing, owning, operating and maintaining new high voltage
(>132 KV) transmission grid and regional interconnections.

3.

Geothermal
Development
Company (GDC)



Responsible for surface exploration of geothermal fields,
exploration, appraisals, drilling, steam production and negotiating
steam sales agreements with investors in the geothermal electricity
generation subsector.
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2.8.2

The National Regulatory Framework on Renewable

Energy Regulations in Kenya are anchored in Sessional Paper No: 4 of 2004,the
Energy Act of 2006, Energy Policy of 2004, which lays the foundation for the current
energy policy and the Feed-in Tariffs policy of 2008 (Revised in 2012), which together
encourage electricity generation through renewable sources. A key pillar with regard
to renewable energy is the Feed-in Tariff policy (FiT) initiated in 2008, which provides
investment security and market stability for investors while motivating private
investors

towards

renewable

energy

technology.
The National Climate Change Response
Strategy enacted in 2014 aims to strengthen
and focus nationwide actions towards
climate

change

emission

adaptation

mitigation.

Another

and

GHG

important

feature is the zero-rating of import duty and
removal of Value Added Tax (VAT) on
renewable

energy

equipment

and

Figure 4: Electricity Grid Network in Kenya
Source: Kenya Power & Lighting

accessories.
2.8.3

Kenya Electricity Grid Network:

The national grid network in Kenya comprises over 30400 km of both transmission
and distribution lines, made up of some 1323 km of 220 kV lines, 3767 km of 132 kV
and 630 km of 66 kV lines. Figure 4 below depicts the transmission network (Solar &
Wind Resource Assessment- Kenya)
According to a study report dubbed “Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP)
Joint Development Partner Scoping Mission, February 7-11, 2011”,: “inadequate
power supply and weak electricity network infrastructure is a brake on Kenya’s
economic performance and threatens Kenya’s ambition set out in its overarching
development program (Vision 2030) to be a middle-income country by 2030”
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(Government of Kenya, 2011). This provides further impetus to the need to consider
self-sustainable off-grid sources for critical infrastructure.

2.8.4

Renewable Energy potential in Kenya:

In its 2002 Kenya Country Report, the Solar and Wind Resource Assessment
(SWERA) projected that about 25% of the country was compatible with current wind
technology. Along the coast, the wind resource varies between 5-7 m/s at 50 metres
height. This finding reflects the fact that Kenya, generally, and her coastal region in
particular, is endowed with adequate wind resources
Studies by the Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment (SWERA) on solar
energy resource potential in Kenya established Kenya received an average solar
radiation equal to 4.5 kWh per square meter per day.” (Kenya Country Report Solar
and Wind Energy Resource Assessment, 2008).
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3

3.0

CHAPTER 3

Maritime Surveillance

Maritime surveillance involves the application of various tools and techniques to
monitor a state’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Dalaklis, 2016
viewed maritime surveillance from two perspectives:
NATO perspective: Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) is “the understanding of
military and non-military events, activities and circumstances within and associated
with the maritime environment that are relevant for current and future NATO
operations and exercises -where the Maritime Environment (ME) is the oceans, seas,
bays, estuaries, waterways, coastal regions and ports” (Dalaklis, 2016)
IMO perspective: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is “the effective understanding
of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety,
economy, or environment”. In the later definition, the maritime domain includes all
areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean,
or other navigable waterway, including all maritime related activities, infrastructure,
people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances” (Dalaklis, 2016)
3.1

Legal basis for Maritime Surveillance:

Two pertinent elements of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
underpin maritime surveillance: the provisions on Maritime Zoning and the notion of
the nationality of ship. Pursuant to UNCLOS (Articles 24 & 25), a Coastal State has
the exclusive right to undertake monitoring and surveillance within its territory
including its territorial sea, which, may extend up to 12 nautical miles (nm) from the
‘baseline’. Figure 5 below depicts the maritime zones. A state’s sovereign rights vary,
across the maritime zones.
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Figure 5: Maritime Jurisdictions

As provided for in UNCLOS, a Coastal State has exclusive rights to undertake
monitoring and surveillance in connection with economic exploitation and exploration
of its EEZ. Further, all States have the implied right to undertake monitoring and
surveillance in the high seas, subject to not interfering with the exercise of the freedom
of the high seas by ships flying a foreign flag. Search and Rescue (SAR) regions, with
purely functional purpose and no correlation with maritime zones claimed pursuant to
UNCLOS, constitute an important basis for maritime surveillance.
3.2

IMO instruments pertaining to the safety of shipping

Dalaklis, 2016 summarized IMO’s global shipping regulatory framework from legal,
trade, environmental and safety perspectives. The various enshrining conventions are
depicted in figure 6 below.

22

LOS – Law of the Sea Convention (1982)

INTERVENTION – convention relating to
intervention on the high seas in cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties (1969)

PAL – The convention relating to the
carriage of Passengers and their Luggage
by Sea (1974)

CLC – Convention in Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (1969)

SUA – Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the safety of
maritime navigation (1988)

IOPC - Convention on the establishment of an
International Compensation Fund for Oil
Pollution Damage (1971, 1992)

Legal

FAL – The Convention on
the Facilitation of
Maritime Traffic (1965)

Trade

IMO

TONNAGE – The
Convention on the
Tonnage Measurement of
Ships (1969)

LLMS – Convention on the Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims (1976)

Environ
mental
protectio

MARPOL – The
Convention on the
Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (1973/78)
SALVAGE – The
International Salvage
Convention (1989)
OPRC – The Convention
on Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Cooperation
(1990)

Safety

SAR – Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue (1979)
LL – The Load line Convention (1966)
CSC – The Convention for Safe Containers
(1972)

SOLAS – The Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea (1974)
STCW – The Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watch keeping
(1978)
COLREG – The Convention on the Prevention
of Collision at Sea (1972)
INMARSAT – The Convention on the
International Maritime Satellite Organisation
(1976)

Figure 6: IMO Conventions
Courtesy: Dalaklis, 2016

In the context of this study, the SAR Convention and the SOLAS Conventions embody
the international regulations that underpin maritime surveillance. SOLAS Convention
covers equipment specification, while the SAR Convention lays down the operational
framework for maritime surveillance. In Kenya, IMO Conventions are enshrined in the
Merchant Shipping Act, 2009, following domestication of the IMO Statutes by Kenya.
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3.3

Surveillance systems

Surveillance systems include visual sightings, still cameras, closed circuit television
(CCTV), radar and infrared imaging. Such systems and techniques are pivotal in the
construction of a maritime picture in situations where either data is not provided under
a reporting regime (whether deliberately or not), in respect of (typically smaller)
vessels that are not subject to a reporting regime.
3.3.1

Military surveillance systems

Gathering of surveillance data is an integral component of the roles undertaken by
navies for defense purposes. This came in the aftermath of the International Ship &
Port Security (ISPS) Code - primarily designed to deter terrorism. Ascertaining precise
amount and scope of data within the purview of military surveillance is not easy, owing
to the confidentiality that surrounds this. Nonetheless, standard modes of gathering
such data include physical observation from military vessels and aircraft, unmanned
vehicles and drones, remote sensing, coastal radars, and underwater sensors.
Military surveillance systems are characterized by their robustness and rigorous
energy requirements.
3.3.2

Commercial Surveillance and Ship reporting systems

These feature less stringent requirements in terms of robustness and energy
consumption, but are applied to fulfil specific monitoring or surveillance needs. Ship
reporting systems include LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking) as
mandated by IMO via SOLAS chapter V, Regulation 19-1 in 2008, AIS (Automatic
Identification System) by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) vide: ITUM 1371, 2014 (Rev) and Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) for fishing vessels,
mandated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) - 1998, plus non‐automatic
reporting through transceiver radio call‐in.
Despite differences in architectural design, all these systems enable the automatic
transmission of ships’ identity and position, sometimes with additional information.
“For many applications, there is a requirement to have an up‐to‐date awareness of
where, within a certain area of interest, all the ships are, who they are, and where
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they are going: i.e. to know the Maritime Situational Picture” (Greidanus, et al., 2013).
This requirement is consistent with obligations pertaining to maritime safety and
security.
Popa, (2011), analysed the success of LRIT in addressing the challenge of piracy,
while Chen, (2014) made a comprehensive comparison between LRIT and Satellite –
based AIS in terms of costs, communications scheme, coverage, information scope
and credibility and emphasized the complementary roles delivered when both
systems are operated concurrently.
Ship reporting systems are provided for in Regulation 11, Chapter V of SOLAS.
Several ship-reporting regimes are incidental within European waters. These include
mandatory systems that apply to specific stretches of water, general obligations to
notify the Ports of destination, and reporting regulations under Vessel Traffic Services
(VTS).
3.3.3

Automatic Identification System (AIS)

Based on Regulation 19 of Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), AIS is mandatory for all vessels of 300 GRT and above on
international voyages, cargo ships of over 500 Gross Registered Tons (GRT), and
passenger vessels irrespective of size. Warships and government owned vessels are
exempted.
AIS enables exchange of data between ships as well as coastal stations, including
the unique Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) of the vessels, Call Sign and
Name, IMO Number and details of the ship, automatically generated dynamic
navigational data and details of the ship’s position, course and speed over ground
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and navigational status, plus manually entered static data. The messages are
transmitted un-encrypted over open frequencies (161.975 MHz & 162.025 MHz for
terrestrial communications and 156.775 MHz & 156.825 MHz for satellite
communications) (ITU-R, 2012) hence allowing everyone with suitable equipment to
receive it. AIS reduces the workload for authorities tasked with monitoring and
controlling coastal and offshore vessels calling at Ports. The slot mapping architecture
of the AIS system is based on Self Organized Time Division Multiple Access
(SOTDMA), depicted in figure 7 above.

Figure 7: AIS System slot mapping architecture,
Source: US Coastguard (USCG)

3.3.4

Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)

LRIT is a collection and distribution system for basic information on vessels. Following
IMO’s adoption of amendments to SOLAS chapter V, Regulation 19-1 in 2008, LRIT
regulations apply to the following ships engaged on international voyages: all
passenger ships including high speed craft, cargo ships, including high speed craft,
of more than 300 GRT, and mobile offshore drilling units. These categories of vessels
are required to automatically transmit their identity, position, and time at six hourly
intervals, with the ability to increase this rate to once every fifteen minutes when
requested while on international voyages.

26

SOLAS Contracting Governments bear operating costs of the system. The system
allows member States to receive position reports from vessels operating under their
flag, vessels seeking entry to a port within their territory, and vessels operating in
proximity to a Member State’s coastline (up to within 1000 nm). Besides enhancing
security and environmental protection, LRIT offers safety/search-and-rescue benefits.
The system architecture is depicted in figure 8 below.

Figure 8: LRIT System architecture,
Source: International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO)

3.3.5

Very High Frequency (VHF) Digital Selective Calling (DSC)

The DSC system provides facilities for calling individual stations, stations in a
specified geographical area or all stations within the radio coverage of the calling
station. DSC may be used for distress calls, safety calls and routine calls and may be
used between ships or between ship and shore. A DSC call contains information on
category of call, identification of the caller, nature of distress, position and type of
subsequent communications. One unique feature with DSC is the prioritization facility,
which enhances the reliability of the radio communication. DSC is a time synchronous
system using 10-unit error detecting code and error correcting transmissions. In
radiotelephony, VHF channel 70 (156,525 MHz) is allocated to DSC only at a data
speed of 1200 Baud.
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3.3.6

Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS)

The Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) is an unclassified,
near real-time AIS data collection and distribution network. It promotes collaboration
and data sharing among international participants, with the primary goal of increasing
maritime security and safety. Data sources may range from a single sensor to an
entire national vessel-tracking network. MSSIS enables password-protected, Internetbased sharing of AIS data using encrypted data links.
The client software for MSSIS runs on Trans view (TV32), providing a common
system interface and vessel tracking display for users. Apart from a suite of
standalone display features, it also serves as a platform for users to access and
contribute to the aggregated, global data.

Figure 9: MSSIS Display at Mombasa RMRCC,
Source: RMRCC Mombasa.

3.3.7

Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel Rescue System (AMVER)

AMVER is a worldwide voluntary vessel reporting system operated by the US
Coastguard to promote safety of life at sea. Mooted in the wake of the Titanic disaster
in 1912, AMVER’s main contribution is to quickly provide Search and Rescue
Authorities with accurate information on the positions and characteristics of vessels
near a reported distress. Request for AMVER assistance with respect to a vessel in
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distress is sent to the US Coast Guard. The request should specify position, vessel’s
details, the center and radius, and request for SURPIC (surface picture). The US
Coastguard promptly faxes back the result, with a rich amount of detail regarding
ships within vicinity of the distressed craft from whom assistance may then be
promptly sought, in tandem with GMDSS distress response procedures.
3.3.8

Vessel Monitoring System (VMS):

Vessel monitoring systems help fisheries administrations to monitor vessel position,
course and speed, with a view to ensuring fishing vessels are doing the right thing. It
is one of the most widespread cooperative surveillance tools currently used for
fisheries management. A VMS system incorporates a transceiver unit that transmits
its GPS coordinates via a communications satellite to a monitoring station ashore.
Currently VMS uses satellite GPS technology that provides position data within 10 m
resolution globally. While there are currently no binding global agreements regarding
the use of VMS, most Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) as
well as many States have mandated its use on larger commercial fishing vessels.
3.3.9

Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)

These are shore based-systems founded on Regulation 12 of SOLAS, supplemented
by guidelines adopted pursuant to IMO Resolution A.857 (20) of November 1997. Port
VTS is primarily concerned with traffic management in and around ports while Coastal
VTS deals with ship traffic through a specific area. Upon entering a VTS area, the
master of a ship is under obligation to report to the authority responsible for the VTS,
and then monitor a specific radio frequency for navigational or other warnings. The
activities of a ship within a VTS area are also monitored via radar, AIS, remote video
cameras, and in some cases radio direction finders (RDF).
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4.0

CHAPTER 4

Management of Kenyan waters.

Management of Kenyan waters is a shared responsibility among several Government
Agencies, with Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) having the lead role in regulatory
aspects. KMA collaborates with several government bodies like the Kenya Ports
Authority (KPA), Ministry of Fisheries, Kenya Maritime Police Unit, Kenya Ferry
Services Ltd, Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) and Kenya Navy among others.
Maritime policies provide a framework that guides the growth of the sector while
ensuring compliance with international and institutionalized approach to maritime
issues. Each Agency’s mandate is stipulated in their respective enabling Acts.
KWS’ main role involves protection and conservation of the marine environment in
the five gazetted national marine parks and reserves through the Wildlife
Conservation and Management (Amendment) Act, 1989. The Kenya Navy mans and
patrols the EEZ against external aggression and illegal activities besides offering
support in search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea. The Kenya
Maritime Police unit patrols the territorial waters, and supports search and rescue
activities at sea. The Unit was established in April 2007 as a law enforcement agency
to deal with maritime activities to provide security along the seas and lakes in Kenya.
4.1

The Institutional framework for Maritime Safety & Security in Kenya.

This is based on a multi-agency approach, achieved through collaboration between
several Government agencies with mandates that cut across the maritime spectrum
as follows:
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Lead Government Agency

Maritime Security component

Kenya Maritime Authority

Maritime Search & Rescue and Pollution
control

Kenya Navy

Patrolling / securing Kenya’s EEZ

Kenya Ports Authority

VTMS and Mombasa port compliance with
ISPS code

Kenya Wildlife Services

Preservation of marine environment/ Law
enforcement capabilities.

Kenya Maritime Police Unit

Patrolling territorial waters/ Law enforcement

Kenya Revenue Authority

Border control/ Prevention of contraband goods

Kenya Fisheries

Prevention of illegal fishing activities

Immigration Department

Border control & prevention of illegal
immigrants

Criminal Investigations Department

Investigations/ prosecution

National Security Intelligence Services

Gathering of intelligence related to piracy/
terrorism.

4.2

The regulation of watercraft in Kenya.

The existing regulatory framework incorporates rules and guidelines for safety,
security and protection of the environment and registration, certification, licensing and
authorization documents, which govern the management of the maritime sector. The
enshrining documents include:
1. The Merchant Shipping Act 2009, (Revised 2012)
2. The Kenya Maritime Authority Act 2006 – Cap No. 5 of 2006,
3. The Fisheries Act, 1989 –Cap 378 - August 1989
4. The Fisheries (Beach Management Unit) Regulations, 2007
5. The Ports Authority Act, 1987-Cap 391 - January 1978
6. The Ferries Act-Cap 410, October 1936
7. The Wildlife (Conservation and Management (Amendment) Act, 1989-No.16
of 1989.
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8. Lakes and Rivers Act-Cap 409, December 1930
4.3

Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA)

Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) was incorporated in June 2004 as a semiautonomous agency with regulatory oversight over the Kenyan maritime industry. It
operates under the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, with head office in the
coastal city of Mombasa. Pollution control, Port and Flag State Control are among
core functions of KMA (KMA Act, 2006). The Authority bears overall responsibility for
the enhancement of Kenya’s regulatory and institutional capacities for maritime safety
and security, effective implementation of international maritime conventions and other
mandatory instruments relating to maritime safety and security. It is also responsible
for the promotion of maritime training, coordination of Search and Rescue, prevention
of marine pollution and promoting preservation of the marine environment besides
generating an enabling environment for trade and maritime investment. These
responsibilities are anchored in the Merchant Shipping Act, 2009 (amended in 2012).
KMA has the mission to strengthen maritime administration in Kenya.
4.3.1

Mombasa Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC)

Mombasa RMRCC was established following the Florence Conference 2000, which
set up a Search and Rescue (SAR) Global Fund and recommended the establishment
of five Regional SAR Centres to cover sea areas adjacent to the African continent
(IMO, 2006). It was commissioned by the IMO Secretary General on 5th May, 2006,
in the implementation phase of the Florence 2000 recommendations, and became the
first Regional Centre in Africa to be so established. The three Sub-Centres that
operate under Mombasa RMRCC are Dar es Salaam, Seychelles, and Somalia
Search region, which still has no GMDSS/ SAR infrastructure in place.
This Centre is the designated focal point for Kenya on all aspects related to maritime
safety information, with coverage extending from Kenya’s territorial waters to the
expansive East Africa Search and Rescue Region. All maritime distress alerts
activated within the region are routed to the Mombasa RMRCC. For incident reporting,
vessels have to originate transmissions to the center.
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Figure 10: RMRCC Mombasa SRR,
Source: RMRCC Mombasa.

4.3.2

Operational roles of RMRCC Mombasa.

The Centre was commissioned as the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(RMRCC) for the East Coast of Africa in May 2006. On 31st March, 2011 the Centre
took up additional roles as a Piracy Information Sharing Centre (ISC) within the
framework of Regional anti-piracy grouping (Djibouti Code of Conduct).
Other delegated functions include collecting data on, and tracking vessels calling at
the Port of Mombasa, receiving and maintaining a database on Kenyan registered/
owned dhows and their areas of operation as a strategy for enhancing Maritime
Domain Awareness. Mombasa RMRCC maintains a 24/7 GMDSS watch and is fitted
with a number of both Satellite and Terrestrial GMDSS and emergency
communication facilities. The MMSI number of the Centre is 00 634 1000. The table
below is a summary of equipment and cost data relative to the operation of the various
systems and facilities from the RMRCC in Mombasa.
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System

Connection
Platform

1.

LRIT

2.

AIS

3.

Electronic
Chart
(C-Map)
111 Toll
free line

Internet

5.

GMDSS
Console

Radio
communications
& Satellite

6

Mercury
System

Secure Internet

7.

MSSIS
Sea Vision

Satellite AIS
delivered via
Internet

8.

ISC VOIP
Facility

Internet

4.

Internet

GSM Network

Primary
function

Area of
applicability

Vessel tracking

1000 NM and
global for flag
vessels

Vessel tracking

30 – 40 NM
within port
vicinity
Worldwide

Vessel location
and Distance
estimation
Incident
reporting by
non-SOLAS
vessels & fishing
boats.

Alerting function
and
communication
with vessels in
distress
Real time
tracking and
anti-piracy
messaging and
chats.
Locating vessels
of interest and
safety related
vessel tracking.
Voice
communication
with other ISCs
and National
Focal Points on
Piracy.

Figure 11: Communication facilities at RMRCC Mombasa
Source: RMRCC Mombasa.

34

Territorial
waters,
subject to
GSM network
coverage.

Sea Areas A1
to A4

Cost
Implication to
the Centre
(US$)
Annual fixed
cost @ 1,200
USD.
Tracking
expenses
charged per
vessels
tracked.
Quarterly
maintenance
Regular
software
updates
Monthly ISDN
standing
charges @
300 USD.
Billing also
done as per
usage.
Annual
maintenance
of equipment

Closed system
- Restricted to
authorized
entities.

Nil.

Global

Nil

Djibouti Code
of Conduct
Partner States
and National
Focal Points.

Nil.

4.4

Discussion of the various systems and arrangements

The consolidated effect of the various facilities, arrangements, regulations and
agreements give effect to Maritime Domain Awareness. Weaknesses in the various
systems and arrangements are reviewed below.
The LRIT system obligates SOLAS Contracting Governments to bear operating costs
of the system. The high cost of tracking vessels does not favour small flag states and
tracking is only possible when the ship borne transmitter equipment is switched on.
Vessel position reports are made available to other Member States for purchase,
whenever a vessel is within 1000 nautical miles of the purchasing coast, or when a
vessel seeking entry to a Member State’s port is at a pre-determined distance or time
period from that port. When the LRIT system in Mombasa is activated on the 1000NM
polygon, vessels as far away as the Gulf of Aden are tracked. This is depicted in the
figure below.

Figure 12: RMRCC Mombasa, LRIT 1000 NM Polygon activation,
Source: RMRCC Mombasa

35

The AIS System is primarily a collision avoidance system with a protocol that involves
a simple and easily manipulated exchange of electronic data via unsecured
connections. While vessels are obligated to transmit their position through the AIS,
there is no system to validate whether the information transmitted is accurate
(Windward Assessment Report, 2014). There are a number of loopholes in the
system, which can be used to manipulate real world AIS/ Satellite data, including:
neglecting to transmit a vessel’s final destination, shutting AIS transmissions, creating
‘Ghost ships’ and manipulating the GPS information.
Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS): Due to its status as a cooperative system, VMS
does not help much with IUU fishing and does not monitor non‐participating vessels.
Vessels can also evade VMS regulations by registering with states which do not
require its use, are not members of RFMOs that require its use, or which require VMS
use but lack the will or capacity to enforce regulations. Vessels may also tamper with
their VMS and disable the equipment, jam signals, or broadcast false position data.
Kenya has not yet operationalized VMS as a fisheries vessel-monitoring tool.
4.5

Maritime Surveillance challenges.

Wambua, 2010, examined the nature and severity of these challenges. In his
assessment: “IUU fishing and maritime security issues stand out as the two main
challenges that have had the greatest impact on the African nations and on the entire
maritime world” (Wambua, 2010). The main challenges facing African states in their
quest to bring order and sound governance to their maritime zones are summarized
below:
1. Challenges pertaining to the delimitation of the maritime zones
2. Weak legal and institutional frameworks for governance of the maritime
zones
3. Lackluster focus on training facilities and institutions to develop a pool of
competent human resources for the governance process
4. Funding challenges for the exploration of and research on marine resources
5. Threat of marine pollution from land-based and ship-based sources
6. IUU fishing from foreign vessels and trawlers
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7. Piracy, armed attack against ships and hostage taking
8. Inadequate preparedness to deal with maritime Search and Rescue
9. Illegal immigration
10. Drug trafficking
11. Smuggling and contraband goods and arms
12. Inadequate port security

B. Hamand, 2016 conducted a study on maritime terrorism (why East Africa
community is the next potential target of maritime terrorism) and observed that the
terrorist activities in the East African Community (EAC) have so far been staged on
land, and mainly in Kenya. The study concluded that “lack of a regional maritime
security strategy (including a Maritime Domain Awareness program), unpoliced
maritime waters and poor cooperation between Kenyan and Tanzanian maritime law
enforcement agencies makes the region extremely vulnerable to maritime terrorism”
(Hamand, 2017)
4.6

Maritime surveillance challenges in remote Islands: Causal Mechanisms

The Kenyan coastline extends for 614 km, stretching along four administrative
Counties: Lamu, Malindi, Mombasa and Kwale and supports approximately 9,000
fishermen, directly through fisheries. According to the Kenya Marine Fisheries
Research Institute (KMFRI) Kenya’s EEZ, measuring some 143,000 km2 is located
within the rich Tuna belt in the South Western Indian Ocean. Statistics gathered by
the MRCC in Mombasa indicate that most of maritime incidents reported in Kenyan
waters happen very close to the shore and in the Inland lakes and affect small vessels
ferrying passengers and fishing community. These vessels are generally ill equipped
with lifesaving and emergency communication facilities, but provide a source of
livelihood for a significant proportion of the nation’s maritime community.
Crime statistics recorded along the Kenyan Coastline by the Kenya Maritime Police
Unit (KMPU) indicate that there is risk of infiltration of small arms, drug trafficking,
influx of refugees, threats of terrorism, piracy, illegal fishing and trawling, and
contraband activities among many other crimes. (KMPU, 2016)
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4.6.1

Lamu Island.

Several studies have been reviewed to project a comprehensive overview of the
current issues at hand. “Lamu district, which includes a very unique island
archipelago, is an area of huge marine potential with a vast amount of underutilized

Figure 13: Lamu Island

assets” (Heddon & Lali, 2006). Lamu Old Town has the status of UNESCO Cultural
Centre (inscribed in 2001), “as the oldest and best preserved Swahili settlement in
East Africa (UNESCO, 2001).
Lamu County extends from the Somali border to about 2° 22’S encompassing the
entire Lamu archipelago which consists of several islands, fishing villages and hubs.
According to the Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute (KMFRI), fishing is a
major economic activity in the area, sustaining 70 % to 75 % of the residents either
directly or Indirectly. The fishing tradition in Lamu dates back to more than 1,200
years. Lamu people are famous for their skills in fish production, boat building, sailing
and other marine activities, which has culminated into a vast seafaring and a thriving
mercantile society. Fishing, being mainly artisanal and subsistent in nature, is
undertaken mostly from small, non-motorized boats such as outriggers, dhows and
planked pirogues. Due to conspicuous challenges in fishing craft technology, fishing
effort is mainly exercised within the reef areas and hardly extends beyond Kenya’s
territorial waters. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing is phenomenal in
these areas.
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4.7

The Piracy challenge.

The subject of Somali piracy has engaged the global maritime community for a long
time since it first appeared during the second phase of the Somali Civil War in the 21st
Century. Actions that embody crime of piracy are defined in the United Nations Laws
of the sea (UNCLOS) Article 101. IMO Resolution A.1025 (26) defines “Armed robbery
against ships, while the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Convention lays down
the legal framework for the prosecution of acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (1988).The analysis of Somali piracy is relevant because of the impact it
generates in relation to maritime surveillance strategies as well as its adverse effect
on commercial vessels destined to the port of Mombasa. During the worst period of
piracy, vessels tended to transit far away from the Somalia coastline, with enormous
repercussions to the economies of the region.
The AIS density map in figure 14 depicts the effect of piracy- at the peak of the
menace. The diversion of ship traffic to avoid the Somalia Coastline meant longer
shipment routes, adding approximately 3500 NM for southbound transit through the
Horn of Africa (HOA). Immediate repercussion included: increased insurance
premiums by shipping lines, reduction of ship traffic as vessels reroute, delays in the
delivery of goods, with costs passed down the supply chain to end-users, decline in
revenue from tourism following increased perception of insecurity including the
“potential use of proceeds from piracy/ ransom to finance terrorism” (Interpol, 2012).
Maritime piracy (The Somali context)
was on the steady rise between early
2009 to late 2012. From 2013, there has
been a reversal. According to European
Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR),
intensified naval operations had by 2012
led to a drastic drop in successful pirate
attacks (EU NAVFOR, 2013).
According to the International Chamber
Figure 14: AIS density map

of Shipping this decrease has been due
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to “the combined success of self-protective measures taken by shipping companies
including adoption of Best Management Practices (BMP4), continued use of privately
contracted armed security on board ships, and military assets in the region”
(International Chamber of Shipping, 2017). But despite this hiatus, the root causes of
the problem remain largely unresolved (illegal fishing and smuggling).
A study conducted by Ghassan Schbley and William Rosenau into Piracy, Illegal
Fishing, and Maritime Insecurity in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania in 2013 concluded
that:” As the number of piracy incidents has dropped, other transnational threats have
emerged. The maritime sector—including commercial vessels, fishing boats, and
small artisanal craft, such as dhows—enables drug traffickers, arms dealers, and
those engaged in human smuggling and trafficking to travel almost undetected up and
down the coastlines of Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania. Some of these illegal activities
are conducted for purely criminal reasons. However, there is evidence of ties between
criminal actors and terrorists associated with al-Qaeda’s affiliates in Africa” (Schbley
& Rosenau, 2013)
Official list by Somalia Government of 40 apprehended suspects noted that 80% were
born in Somalia’s southern conflict zones, while only 20% came from more stable
regions. According to a BBC assessment report (published in 2008), pirates can be
ranked in three categories: Local fishermen – considered the brain of the pirates’
operation because of their skills and knowledge of the sea, Ex-militiamen who
previously fought for the local clan warlords or ex-military from the former Barre
Government and Technical experts – who operate equipment such as GPS devices.
Their illegal activities have tended to escalate southwards, towards the maritime
boundary with Kenya. Because of the proximity and ease of access to the Islands
constituting the Lamu archipelago across the maritime border with Kenya, concerns
over resurgence of these vices are well founded.
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4.7.1

Maritime Incidents in Lamu

These can be characterized as either security related (terrorist/ piracy) or safety
related (distress incidents like capsizing, man overboard and the like). The two
outstanding security related incidents with landmark effect on Kenya’s maritime
surveillance strategies in Lamu are visited below:
In September 2011 a UK national, Judith Tebbutt, was kidnapped and her husband
David killed following a terrorist raid on Kiwayu Island, one of the outlying remote
Islands close to the maritime border with Somalia. A pirate gang released her six
months later. Invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, Kenya sent troops in mid-October
2011 across the border to Somalia, in pursuit of the invaders. The military and political
stalemate occasioned by this event remain outstanding to date.

Figure 15: Mpeketoni in Lamu,
Source Google maps

In another incident in June 2014, at least 48 people were killed in a terrorist raid in
Mpeketoni, a trading center on the mainland 20 miles south-west of Lamu Island. This
incident was another milestone in shaping up maritime surveillance strategies in the
Lamu area. As depicted in figure 15 above, access to Mpeketoni is possible both by
sea and by land. The first kidnap attack in October, 2011 was launched from the sea
side.
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4.7.2

Safety related incidents.

Based on IMO taxonomy and the code of “the International Standards and
Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine
Incident” (Casualty Investigation Code), boat accidents recorded along the Kenyan
coastline between 2014 to 2016 were very serious - 14, serious – 14, less serious - 3
and marine incidents - 10.
Table 4: Maritime incidents recorded along the Kenyan Coastline

Severity
Very serious
Serious
Less serious
Marine Incidents
Total

4.8

2014
3
2
0
1
6

2015
2
4
2
4
12

2016
9
8
1
5
23

Total
14
14
3
10
41

Analysis using Pareto 80-20 rule.

“The Pareto rule is extremely helpful in bringing swift and easy clarity to complex
situations and problems, especially when deciding where to focus effort and
resources” (businessballs.com, 2017). Named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848 – 1923), it
propagates the following widely accepted and empirically tested hypotheses (among
others): 80% of results come from 20% of efforts, 80% of problems come from 20%
of causes, and 80% of activity will require 20% of resources.
The principle is broadly applicable in situations requiring rationalization, streamlining,
and greater focus. A. Gorny, 2015, applied the principle to analyze occupational
accidents in Poland. According to Gorny, “the tool helped in the identification of event
causes and measures necessary to effectively reduce accident rates and severity”
(Gorny, 2015). Based on his studies the empirical relationship whereby roughly 20%
was helpful in effectively identifying the causes of the majority of problems was
ascertained. With respect to accidents, one may assume that by diagnosing 20% of
accident causes one can eliminate approximately 80% of the effects, which elevate
accident rates and constitute the key driver of losses suffered by organizations.
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Pareto analysis was also applied to the analysis of safety at sea by R. Ziarati, 2007.
In his assessment, “Pareto focuses on the problems that offer the greatest potential
for improvement, showing their relative frequency or size in descending order. It helps
a team to concentrate on those causes which have greatest impact if remedied”
(Ziarati, 2007)
4.8.1

Analysis of the Kenyan scenario.

Data on maritime incidents in Kenyan waters (Coastal and Inland) recorded at the
RMRCC in Mombasa between 2014 to 2016, is depicted below. Although not
considered in this analysis, incidents encountered in 2017 so far (by August 2017)
has reached the level of 20.

Incident
2014 2015 2016 Total
type
3
Collision
2
1
0
45
Capsizing
9
20
16
2
Flooding
0
2
0
7
Drifting
0
3
4
1
Man
0
1
0
overboard
12
Drowning
1
2
9
3
Unknown/
1
0
2
Vessel
lost
1
Fire
0
0
1
onboard
3
Grounding
0
3
0
2
Ditching
0
0
2
0
Pirated
0
0
0
Total
13
32
34
79

Descending cumulative Percentage
order
45
45
57.7%
12
57
73.1%
7
64
82.1%
3
67
85.9%
3
70
89.7%
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3
2

73
75

93.6%
96.2%

2

77

97.5%

1
1
0

78
79
79

98.7%
100%
100%

Count of Incidents

Pareto Analysis
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0

Count
Cumulative %

The main observation from this analysis is that there is need to place more focus on
measures to minimize capsizing and drowning incidents. This is under the remit of
Kenya Maritime Authority (with overall mandate on maritime safety). Either water
ingress or heavy seas were responsible for most of these capsizing incidents. This
calls for tightening of the regulatory regime round vessel inspections, to ensure overall
compliance with safety and lifesaving appliances.
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5

5.0

CHAPTER 5

Maritime surveillance in Papua New Guinea (PNG), A case study

In this chapter, maritime surveillance of remote islands in Kenya is compared to that
in Papua New Guinea. Kenya’s approach is labour intensive, relying more on patrols
and regulatory vessel inspections, whereas following installation of state of the art
surveillance system in remote locations, powered through solar and wind, PNG’s
system can be deemed to be comparatively more technology intensive.
5.0.1

Country background

Papua New Guinea is an island state in the southwestern Pacific Ocean with 5,152
km of coastline and 2.7 million square km of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Out of
the country’s 22 provinces, fifteen are coastal or island provinces, providing home for

Figure 16: Papua New Guinea,
Source: Source: https://www.britannica.com/Papua-New-Guinea
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some 60% of the national population. Much of the country’s coastline is only
accessible by sea. The national capital, Port Moresby, is located in southeastern New
Guinea on the Coral Sea.
Papua New Guinea has been a member of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) since 1976, and is a signatory to the following international maritime safety
conventions: Load Lines Convention (1966), Tonnage Convention (1969), Collisions
Prevention (COLREG) (1972), Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (1974), Standards of
Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCWS), (1978), and
Search and Rescue (SAR) (1979). The National Maritime Safety Authority (NMSA) is
responsible for PNG’s compliance with the above international safety conventions.
5.1

PNG Maritime Surveillance System.

PNG’s maritime surveillance system was installed in 2013, at a cost of 48 Million US
Dollars. It is an integrated system, incorporating Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), Vessel
Traffic Management Information System (VTMIS) and Coastal Monitoring System
(CMS). It comprises all the necessary components for integration of radar and AIS
sensor data, real-time traffic data processing, GPS-time-stamped traffic data
recording for farther playback, distribution of traffic data between displaying
terminal(s), visual tracking of selected targets by long-range CCTV, VHF Voice
Communication and VTS event data storage. The architecture of the system is
presented in figure 17 below.
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Figure 17: Maritime Surveillance System for PNG,
Source: National Maritime Safety Authority, Papua New Guinea

5.1.1

Discussion of the PNG Maritime Surveillance System:

Papua New Guinea inland waterways covers some
9,980 km2 within a coastline measured from the
archipelagic baseline. NMSA monitors shipping and
Vitiaz
Strait

shipping activities via five terrestrial AIS base
stations, three CMS stations, which also has AIS,
RADAR, and VTS compliant Live CCTV capabilities.

Cape St.
George
Kiriiwina

Port Moresby
Torres
Strait
Jomard
Entrance

Rossel is.

Other monitoring capabilities include the LRIT
system and AMSA’s Craft Tracking System shared
to NMSA under a data sharing agreement.

Figure 18: Papua New Guinea AIS

!

A major area of challenge involves the detection and Map
tracking of small objects and isolation of possible

threats from legitimate shipping, fishing and other maritime activities. Issues that
present overbearing challenges include gaps in detection of small targets, low-level
coordination and information sharing between responsible agencies (fragmentation of
organizations in the maritime security domain), limited inter-operability between
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sectoral stakeholders and systems and the need to link up networks of heterogeneous
sensors as an avenue to developing early warning systems.
5.1.2

Power arrangements and energy profile:

Papua New Guinea’s maritime surveillance system is fully powered from solar PV,
with planned wind integration to provide back up and redundancy. The powering
scheme of the system is tabulated below. As per the records of the National Maritime
Safety Authority, only three power related issues have occurred. These were reported
between August and September 2014 – shortly after commissioning of the system,
and involved overload in the various sites. These were resolved through replacements
with larger automatic restart marine circuit breakers.
Table 5: PNG Maritime Surveillance System: Power demand,
Source: National Maritime Safety Agency, PNG

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Unit
Radar Sensor 9ft (9 ft) 25 kw
Radar Processor
AIS Base-station
CCTV (MIC-400)
RS/ IP Converter
IP Relay plus Sensors
LAN Switch
Weather Station
Enclosure Fans
Total Consumption

Voltage
24 VDC
24 VDC
12/ 24 VDC
12/ 24 VDC
10 – 30 VDC
12/ 24 VDC
24 VDC
5 – 32 VDC
24 VDC
24 VDC

Average Power Consumption
Selected full system power for calculation
Calculated system current
Total usage in Ampere-hours in 24 hour period

Power
Peak
Mean
200
90
60
40
70
70
25
10
19
10
10
2
8
5
1
1
10.4
5.2
408.4
235.2
321.8 Watts
345 Watts
14.375 Amps
345 Amps

Solar Panel Calculations.
1
2
3
4
5
6

% of total generation from wind turbine
Remaining power to be generated by solar
Average sun-hours
Solar power input from sun-hours
Solar power required
Quantity of 330 Watts Solar Panels

0%
345 Amps
6
57.5 Amps
1380 Watts
4 Panels

Battery Calculations
Description
1
2
3
4

Load Current
Battery autonomy
Load Current with autonomy
No. of 12 V, 100AH batteries
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Total
345 AH
3 Days
1035 AH
22

5.2

Improvement of Maritime Surveillance in Kenya

This section reviews some actions and planning necessary, for the enhancement of
maritime surveillance in Kenya’s coastal remote islands. The maritime situation along
Kenya’s 614 km Coastline can be summarized as follows: there are piracy challenges
towards the maritime border with Somalia, IUU fishing challenges along the entire
stretch of the coastline, small boat safety concerns and constrained capacity in
relation to maritime search and rescue services- specifically for small boats and
passenger ferries.
In Lamu area, (whose outlying remote islands constitute the main subject of this
study), a Mega Port Project (LAPPSET) is underway therefore necessitating urgent
paradigm shift by all stakeholders for safer navigation and use of the waterway, which
will be open to international maritime traffic once the Lamu port commences
operations.
5.2.1

Policy context and key issues

Interagency engagement has been a key pillar in Kenya’s maritime strategies. The
synergies, which come with this approach, are reaffirmed by the overall improvements
witnessed in both maritime safety and security in the country, following the
establishment of a Presidential Blue Economy Committee in 2017. “A number of other
Committees, including, Security, Border Management and Fisheries, deal with
Kenya’s marine policy” (Bueger, 2017).
Through revisions to the National Security Act, 2015, Kenya has codified her InterAgency relations, which now provides the overarching legal framework for interagency engagements in the pursuit of maritime safety and security. Much more can
be achieved by extending this Inter-Agency engagement to the level of procurement
of maritime surveillance equipment. This could involve encouraging joint procurement
of monitoring equipment, whereby priority could be given to equipment that
concurrently feeds the information needs of several agencies in the maritime sector,
whilst applying renewable energy solution.
sustainability and minimum operating costs.
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Such an approach would ensure

5.2.2

Institutional framework for the improvement of Maritime Surveillance.

The proposed roadmap borrows from the EU system, which is designed to deliver “a
cost effective decentralized interconnection of different information layers that
increases the efficiency of maritime surveillance systems by filling existing information
gaps, while avoiding data duplication” (European Commission, 2010). The framework
was recommended to the European Parliament by a special commission on the “Draft
roadmap towards establishing the common information sharing environment for the
surveillance of the EU Maritime Domain (COM 2010 – 584).
Four steps are clearly mapped in this approach: (1) Identifying user communities, (2)
Mapping of data sets and Gap Analysis, which involves identifying relevant data that
each agency avails (supply mapping), its demand for data from other agencies
(demand mapping) and indicating the legal basis for each data set. (3) Common data
classification levels and (4) Developing the supporting framework. The framework is
hereby contextualized to the maritime scenario in Kenya. In terms of step (1), the
following user communities apply for the Kenyan case:
a. Maritime Safety (including search and rescue, maritime security and prevention
of pollution by ships) – Kenya Maritime Authority.
b. Fisheries control – Ministry of Fisheries
c. Marine Pollution Preparedness and Response – Oil Spill Mutual Assistance Group
(OSMAG)
d. Customs – Kenya Revenue Authority.
e. Border Control – The Kenya Immigration Department.
f.

Law Enforcement – Kenya Maritime Police Unit.

g. Defense – Kenya Navy

50

Common Information Sharing

Kenya Fisheries

VMS

Environment

Kenya Maritime Authority

Vessel tracking (AIS, LRIT)

Navy

MASURA

Maritime Police Unit

Operational support

Information Sharing

Common database

Figure 19: Information Layers (Nonhierarchical),
Adapted from: Integrating Maritime Surveillance, EC.

5.2.3

Improvement of incident reporting: VHF Radio Repeater network.
The effectiveness of technology was demonstrated in a study undertaken by the US
Border and Maritime Security Division and NREL in 2013, in a joint research into the
potential for renewable energy applications in border security. The study concluded
that renewable energy technologies can provide sustainable, reliable power for a
variety of applications within maritime surveillance. Their findings provide interesting
impetus for consideration in this study.
According to the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2011, one major
challenge with most surveillance systems stems from the fact that, “Maritime
Surveillance systems are developed mainly for maritime safety purposes, and were
not designed with sufficient attention to security aspects” (Centre for Strategy and
Evaluation Services, 2011).
Maritime surveillance in Kenya’s remote coastal islands can be improved through
appropriate interagency information sharing arrangements and the installation of
facilities and equipment to improve incident reporting.
A technical field survey was conducted to identify suitable sites for VHF radio
repeaters, within the remote coastal islands. The survey had specific eye on existing
manned radio base stations by maritime stakeholders, the expectation being that
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critical requirements such as security of equipment, would be granted. Although
Kenya Maritime Authority has a broad remit in relation to maritime safety, she is still
in the process of establishing presence along the coastline. So far, only one Rescue
Sub-Centre is operational in Lamu. In the spirit of the National Security Act (2015),
the focus of this survey was on sites/ radio base stations manned by the following
Agencies: Kenya Maritime Police Unit, Kenya Wildlife Service, and Kenya Fisheries.
Based on reports from the RMRCC in Mombasa, there have been claims of the
existence of radio blind spots4 in some offshore areas, hence necessitating the
installation of VHF radio repeaters. Therefore important parameters considered in this
survey included:
Range: whereby communication on VHF is limited to the line of sight (LOS) and the
range is estimated using the formula:

Range5 (km) = 4.12(√ H1+√𝐻 2)

Where H1 and H2 are the two effective antenna heights in meters. For maritime
communications, the antenna heights are referenced to height above sea level. Based
on IMO guidelines for GMDSS shore-based facilities, it is assumed that antenna
height on board ships may be as low as 4 meters.
Distance between stations: VHF antennas with omnidirectional radiation provide
circular coverage, hence some dips occur in the coverage areas between two
adjacent stations and such dips are dependent on the distance between the antennas.
Table 1 below indicates typical variations of range within the dips.

Areas where complete degradation/ cancellation of the VHF signal is experienced as a result of
topography.
5 The equation for deduction of line of sight distance between two adjacent antennas.
4
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Table 6: Dips in the VHF Range,
Source: Eirik Bliksurd, 2016

Distance
between

1 times full

1.5 times

1.7 times

1.8 times

1.9 times

2 times full

range

full range

full range

full range

full range

range

87%

66%

53%

44%

31%

0%

antennas
Range in
the dip as a
percentage
of full range

Figure 20: Dips in the VHF Range
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Table 7: Range for various antenna heights
Shore based
Calculated
SITE
antenna
range (mts)
height above
sea level (mts)
Shimoni
10
21

Government
Agencies

Kenya
Fisheries
K.W.S
KMPU
K.M.P.U

39’ 48” S,

2

390 21’ 06” E
10

390 28’ 36” E
20 17’ 49” S,

20

K.W.S

400 54’ 47” E
10 44’ 53” S,

10

K.M.P.U
Kenya Police

410 29’ 24” E
20 0’ 58” S,

3

Kipini

K.W.S

410 15’ 54” E
20 31’ 22” S,

5

400 32’ 20” E
30 07’ 51” S,

10

Msambweni

20

27

Lamu

KMA Site
offices

25

29

Kiunga

30

31

Kiwayu

40

34

Malindi

Kenya Police
K.W.S

45

36

Watamu

K.W.S

400 21’ 06” E
40 39’ 48” S,

3

50

47

Ngomeni

K.M.P.U

400 21’ 06” E
20 59’ 39” S,

40

100

49

Kenya
Fisheries
Kenya
Fisheries

Kilifi

Mtwapa

K.W.S
Kenya Police
line

5.2.4

40

40 28’ 36” S,

24

33

Elevation
Mts.

15

35

Coordinates

400 12’ 09” E
30 38’ 05” S,

5

390 50’ 44” E
40 39’ 48” S,

2

390 21’ 06” E

Antenna arrangement:

Maritime VHF service employs frequency modulation (FM) and vertical polarization,
using half-wave omnidirectional dipole antennas in the horizontal plane with 2.15 dBi
antenna gain. The VHF wavelength is 2 meters. Both single dipoles and folded dipoles
may be used. The single dipole has approximately 75-ohm antenna impedance,
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whereas the folded dipole has similar radiation properties, but the impedance is 300
ohms and a larger frequency bandwidth of the antenna.
For VHF systems operating on more than one channel in the one-frequency simplex
mode with individual antennas on frequencies in the same band, the antennas are
installed at different levels in a straight vertical line, one antenna above the other as
per the figure below. The distance between the extremes of the different antennas
should be at least one wavelength.
5.2.5

Proposed Station Solution:

It is assumed that each station would handle DSC distress calls (channel 70), voice
distress/safety and calling on channel 16, navigation information on channels AIS 1
and AIS 2, and voice communications. The figure below indicates schematic structure
of the station solution operating on channel 70, channel 16, the terrestrial AIS
channels and one voice communication in accordance with ITU Radio Regulations
Appendix 18. The AIS equipment would operate on both AIS 1 (161.975 MHz) and
AIS 2 (162. 025 MHz).
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Figure 21: VHF antenna structure

Figure 22: Proposed VHF coverage area,
Source: Google map
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5.2.6

Estimated solar power requirement for each station:

Data from the Solar and Wind Resource Assessment (SWERA), a UNEP supported
global initiative, projects that the wind resource along the Kenyan coastline averages
5 – 7 m/s at 50 metres height, while for solar, the country receives an average of 4.5
KWh/m2 per day (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2013). With these average
figures, the renewable energy resources are in sufficient quantities for standard
application in the maritime surveillance domain. For the VHF Radio repeater network,
the estimates for solar energy requirement per site is presented in table 4 below.
Table 8: Solar PV requirement per VHF Repeater site,
Source: Solar PV Quotation by Wilken Telecommunications (K) Ltd

Item
130
Panel

Quantity
W

1

130

Item
Batteries
140
Watt
Panels
Inverter
Charge
controller

5.3

Watts

Total Wattage
130

Description
12V, 200 AH

Operating
hours
24

3120

Total

3120

Items
1.87777
2.857142857

Watthours

QTY
2
3

36 watts
30 Amps

Conclusion

This paper has examined the subject of maritime surveillance in Kenya’s remote
coastal islands, and established a justification for improvements in the current state
of facilities and arrangements. These improvements can be realized piecemeal,
through the establishment of an enabling policy framework, strengthening interagency engagement and then applying appropriate technology. Following the
enactment of the National Security Act, 2015, the stage is already well set for active
inter-agency participation. At the regional and international levels, it is important to
harness the networks established through cooperation agreements and memoranda
of understanding (such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct) and more recently the
Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centres.
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This study also investigated the possibilities of solar power in maritime surveillance
applications and ascertained that energy requirements for powering a single VHF
repeater can range between 312 watts per site to 3180 watts for a complete maritime
surveillance package, as per the Papua New Guinea System..
Owing to various site-specific parameters including land acquisition process in Kenya,
the ascertainment of full cost requires the consideration of various additional factors
and externalities, and is therefore recommended as the subject of future research.
5.4
Other

Recommendations
operational

measures,

alongside

the

discussed

measures

include,

strengthening Beach Management Units (BMUs). BMUs in Kenya are established in
accordance with the provisions of the Fisheries Act, (Beach Management
Regulations, 2007 Cap 378). Among other important functions, BMUs provide an
avenue for strengthening the management of fish landing sites, fishery resources and
aquatic environment. More importantly, they are equipped to prevent or mitigate
conflicts in the fisheries sector (FAO, 2012). According to Ngige and Jaeckel, 2007,
the essence of BMUs is that “it creates a link and a partnership between the
government level and artisanal fishermen.
Along Kenya’s Indian Ocean coastline, there are 27 BMUs and 209 fish landing sites
(KMA, 2015). A close collaboration exists between Fisheries, BMUs and the Maritime
Authority in Kenya. Kenya Maritime Authority has dependability on BMU members’
skills who are normally the first to arrive on-scene whenever local fishing and small
passenger boats are involved in accident. This makes them dependable partners on
search and rescue operations involving small boats. Through sensitization and
general awareness campaigns, BMUs can be made proactive partners in relation to
developing a resilient Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) structure to cope with
maritime crime in Kenya’s coastal remote islands.

The author recommends further research into how the following renewable energy
options can be harnessed for both mobile and fixed maritime surveillance
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applications: photovoltaics, wind, energy transfer (batteries), energy transfer
(wireless), and fuel cells.
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Appendix 1 Levelised cost of Renewable Energy
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7.1

Solar PV Project Cost Calculator

Appendix 2

Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) - Coastal Surveillance

August, 2017

Inputs hi ghl i ghted i n Yel l ow

LCOE Calculator
System Inputs

Input Description

System Size (kW-DC)
1st-Year Production (kWh)
Annual Degradation

Production
(kWh)

Year

3 (Please insert the aggregate system size for a site)
187 (Please insert the aggregate forecasted system production at a site
0.50% (Please insert the expected system yearly performance degradation)

Direct Purchase Inputs

Direct Purchase
Cost ($)
$
2,308

O&M
Cost ($)

PPA Escalator
(%)
-

PPA Rate
($/kWh)

PPA Cost
($)

0
1
2
3
4

187
186
185
184

$
$
$
$

45
46
48
49

$ 0.1500
3% $ 0.1545
3% $ 0.1591
3% $ 0.1639

$
$
$
$

28
29
29
30

5

183

$

51

3% $ 0.1688

$

31

6

183

$

52

3% $ 0.1739

$

32

7
8
9
10

182
181
180
179

$
$
$
$

54
55
57
59

3%
3%
3%
3%

0.1791
0.1845
0.1900
0.1957

$
$
$
$

33
33
34
35

11

178

$

60

3% $ 0.2016

$

36

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

177
176
175
175
174
173
172
171
170
169
168
168
167
166
4,410

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

62
64
66
68
70
72
74
77
79
81
84
86
89
91
1,641

3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
51
957

(Please insert total system cost per Watt. If not available, use the

Cost ($/W)

$

Initial Rebate/Incentive

$

O&M Cost ($/kW)

$

0.769 formula:
Cost ($/W) = (Total-system-cost/Total-system-size-in-watts)
(Please insert the total value of rebates/incentives received within the
first year)

-

15.00 (Please insert the per kW O&M cost. If not available, use the formula:
O&M Cost ($/kW) = (1st-year-O&M-Cost/Total-system-size-in-kW)

O&M Escalator (%)

3% (Please insert the expected yearly escalation)

PPA Inputs
PPA Rate ($/kWh)

$

0.15000 (Please insert the per kWh PPA Rate. If not available, use the formula:
PPA Rate ($/kWh) = (1st-year-PPA-Cost/1st-year-system-prduction)
(Please insert the expected yearly escalation. If not uniform, manually

PPA Escalator

3.00% insert yearly escalation in Column I)

LCOE Outputs*
Direct Purchase
20 Year
25 Year

$
$

0.98473
0.89539

PPA
20 Year
25 Year

$
$

0.20054
0.21709

* Compare to expected utility costs over the next 20 years

* Compare to expected utility costs over the next 20 years

Item

2 x 12V, 200 AH Batteries
3 x 140 watt panels
1 x 375 watt inverter
1 x charge controller
Electrical assessories
Installation
Total

Total Cost (Ksh)
Unit Cost (Ksh)
63600
31800
17017
17017
16575
16575
25089
25089
25000
25000
25000
25000

Total

Item
Description
Batteries 12V, 200 AH
140 Watt Panels
Inverter
Charge Controller
Total

206315

16% VAT

33010
239,325

1 Ksh = US$ 0.01
239325 = 2393.25

$
$
$
$

Producti on pe r s i te = 3120 wa tts = 187.2 KWh
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$

2,308

Quantity
1.87777
2.857142857

23.3333

QTY
2
3
36 Watts
30 Amps

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

0.2076
0.2139
0.2203
0.2269
0.2337
0.2407
0.2479
0.2554
0.2630
0.2709
0.2790
0.2874
0.2960
0.3049
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7.2

Maritime incidents recorded in Kenyan waters (Source RMRCC Mombasa)

N
O.

DATE

COAST REGION

INCIDENT/ ACCIDENT
TYPE

CAUSE

REMARKS

1

01/05/2
014

Malindi Marine N.
Park

Not stated

Not stated

No Casualties

2

03/11/2
014

Mombasa - Neptune
Beach Hotel

Collision

Jetski rammed
into a boat

1 died

3

16/12/2
014

Lamu

Collision

Human error

1 died

4

20/11/2
014

Mombasa Marine
park

Capsized

Rough
Weather

5 rescued

5

21/11/2
014

Kipini

Capsized

Rough
Weather

1died

6

22/12/2
014

Mombasa Marine
park

Capsized

Rough
Weather

6 rescued

7

2/1/201
5

Diani - South Coast

Capsized

Rough
weather

4 persons rescued

8

10/1/20
15

Diani - South Coast

Vessel flooding

Aground

15 persons rescued

9

14/01/2
015

Lamu

Vessel Adrift

Mechanical
Problems

Vessel repaired

10

19/01/2
015

Kisite mpunguti
Area

Grounding

Vessel ran
aground

12 crew rescued

11

6/4/201
5

North coast whitesands Beach

Capsizing

12

19/05/2
015

Kiwayu - Shimo La
Tewa

Capsizing

13

25/05/2
015

Malindi Marine N.
Park

Taking on Water

Mechanical
Problems

Vessel repaired

14

9/7/201
5

Mkundeni - Lamu

Capsizing

Strong
Currents

3 Rescued 1 Died

-

3 Children rescued, 9
bodies recovered
4 persons rescued

-
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15

24/7/20
15

Lamu

Capsizing

-

2 Rescued 3 Died

16

25/7/20
15

Lamu

Capsizing

17

23/08/2
015

Lamu

Accident - swimming
person

Human error

1 rescued

18

22/9/20
15

Mambrui Malindi

Grounding

Hitting Sand
Dune

20 crew all rescued.

19

19/10/2
015

Mombasa

Drifting

Failed
steering

2 Rescued

20

20/01/2
016

Shimoni

Lost Vessel

Drifting, lost
main sail

4 persons Rescued

21

28/02/2
016

Lamu - Manda bay

Capsizing

Strong waves

2 rescued

22

11/3/20
16

Magogoni

Capsizing

_

_

23

28/03/2
016

Dongo Kundu

Drowning

_

1 Body found

24

15/04/2
016

Mtwapa bridge

Drowning

Diving.
Human error

1 Body found

25

10/5/20
16

Mkokoni - lamu

Capsizing

Unknown

2 persons rescued

26

17/05/2
016

Shimoni

Overdue.drifted due to
mechanical failure

Fishing

5 Kenyans on board

26

24/05/2
016

Junda creek

Drowning

28

25/05/2
016

Likoni

Drowning

29

28/05/2
016

Mtwapa Creek

Drowning

30

6/6/201
6

Likoni Channel

Ditched

2 Rescued.
-

_

Mechanical
Problems
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1 Body found

1 body retrieved

31

9/6/201
6

Mkandani (Kililawa
channel)

capsized

Hit a rock

All 18 passengers
rescued

32

13/06/2
016

English point

Capsized

Strong waves

All 6 people on board
rescued

33

7/7/201
6

Diani - near Congo
Mosque

Drowning

Strong waves

1 died

34

26/7/20
16

Mtwapa Creek

Capsized

Rough
Weather

2 swam to safety, 1
drowned

35

26/7/20
16

Pemba channel

Drifting

Engine
Breakdown

towed by Swabil Jamil
boat 5 rescued

36

29/7/20
16

Mtwapa

Drowning

Rough
Weather

2 swam to safety, 2
drowned

37

2/8/201
6

Tudor creek

Capsizing

Rough
Weather

2 swam to safety , 1
drowned

38

17/08/2
016

Diani - Tiwi

Drowning

Strong waves

2 died

39

24/08/2
016

Lamu

Capsizing

Rough
Weather

4 rescued

40

29/08/2
016

Mvudheni (Lamu Kiunga)

Capsizing

Rough
Weather

5 rescued

41

6/9/201
6

Msambweni

Capsizing

Rough
Weather

12 survived 4 dead

N
O.

DATE

LAKE REGION

INCIDENT/ ACCIDENT
TYPE

CAUSE

REMARKS

1

10/01/2
014

Sumba Channel (L.
Victoria)

Possibly Capsizement

Rough
Weather

No Casualties

2

18/04/2
014

Masinga Dam

Capsizement

Rough
weather

1 died.

3

12/05/2
014

Lake Naivasha

Drowning

Falling
overboard

1 died
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4

18/05/2
014

Lake Naivasha

Capsizement

Waves and
panic hence
alteration of
the vessel
stability
Hippo
knocked down
boat

2 died

5

11/11/2
014

Wakondo - Lusinga
Island

Capsized

6

18/11/2
014

Budalangi

Capsized

Not stated

1 died

7

18/11/2
014

Luyoro - Turkana

Capsized

Overloading
and bad
weather

1 person died 7 were
rescued

8

8/1/201
5

Kusa Beach - Lake
Victoria

Trapped

Stuck in
hyacinth

2 persons rescued

9

29/03/2
015

Lake Turkana

Capsizing

Overloading

11 people rescued,

10

13/4/20
15

Gwassi, North
Mbita

Capsizing

Old boat

2 men died

11

15/04/2
015

Kisagi, Gwassi
Mbita

Capsizing

Unknown

3 persons saved

12

17/04/2
015

Uterere Beach

Capsizing

Unknown

3 Fishermen rescued

13

19/04/2
015

Kisegi Beach, Guasi
North

Capsizing

Old boat

2 persons rescued

14

13/05/2
015

Shelly Beach

Engine Failure

Going for
repair

2 persons rescued

15

16/05/2
015

Luyoro - Turkana

Capsizing

Bad weather

4 persons rescued

16

27/05/2
015

Busia

Capsizing

Strong Winds

2 drowned 1 survived

17

19/06/2
015

Nyandiwa, Suba

Sinking

Drifting, Hit
rocks

3 drowned, 3 rescued

18

2/7/201
5

Omena Beach

Drowning

Drunkardness

1 Person died
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1 died 3 swam to safety

19

11/7/20
15

Longech - Turkana

Capsizing

Unknown

4 Rescued

20

5/8/201
5

Homabay Sori

Collision

No lighting at
night

2 Children perished, 21
adults rescued.The boat
was sailling without
lights.

21

12/8/20
15

lake Naivasha

Capsizing

Strong winds

3 Rescued 3 Died

22

4/10/20
15

Asebo - bay , L.
Victoria

Capsizing

Bad weather

1rescued 1 died

23

18/10/2
015

Uganda waters

Drowning

dropped in the
water

1 died

24

23/11/2
015

River Sio Busia

Capsizing

Swell of River
Sio

2 Rescued 2 Drowned

25

25/02/2
016

Masinga Dam

Capsizing

Overloading

3 Rescued 2 Drowned

26

2/4/201
6

Sori Beach

Capsizing

Unknown

2 drowned

27

25/6/20
16

Liunda Beach to
Denda Island

Strong winds

9 rescued 9 drowned

28

4/7/201
6

Kisiu Beach

Drowning

Hippo attack

1 person died

29

4/7/201
6

Mahanga beach

Capsizing

Hit rocks

2 survived , 2 drowned

30

7/7/201
6

Misori beach

Capsizing

Strong Winds

2 Rescued 2 Drowned

31

16/8/20
16

Mageta - Usenge
Island

Capsizing

Strong waves

1survived 1 drowned

32

24/08/2
016

Lake Kenyatta

Drowning

slipped

1 dead

33

9/9/201
6

Kisumu port

Fire on board

Engine room

5 rescued

Capsizing
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